ALF Urges New Trial In Benzene Exposure Suit Based On Philadelphia Trial Judge’s Abuse Of Expert Testimony Admissibility Requirements
Plaintiff-Appellee Paul Gill claims that his exposure to multiple benzene-containing products over several decades, including a relatively brief exposure to gasoline while working at a Mobil service station from 1975-1979, caused him to develop acute myeloid leukemia. He and his wife filed suit in Philadelphia’s notoriously plaintiff-friendly Court of Common Pleas.
Mr. Gill initially asserted causes of action related to benzene-containing products against numerous defendants, but the case went to the jury only on negligence, strict liability design defect, and failure to warn claims against Defendant-Appellant Exxon Mobil Corporation (“ExxonMobil”). The jury found in favor of Mr. Gill and returned an astounding $725,500,000 compensatory damages verdict.
ExxonMobil has appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. ALF has submitted an amicus brief supporting ExxonMobil and focusing on the trial court’s dereliction of duty under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 in admitting the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on general causation. Steven M. Coren and Matthew R. Williams of Coren & Ress, P.C. in Philadelphia served as ALF’s counsel of record on the brief. The brief was authored by Eric G. Lasker, Heather A. Pigman, Brett S. Covington, and Joesph F. Altieri of Hollingsworth LLP in Washington, D.C.
Issue Areas:
Sound Science
Case:
Gill v. Exxon Mobil, Corp. (2811 EDA 2024) (Superior Court of Pennsylvania)
Read the Amicus Brief:
Question(s) Presented:
Whether the state trial court failed to fulfill its duty under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 by admitting the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on general causation without first determining whether it was based on generally accepted scientific methodology, and without first considering ExxonMobil’s competing expert testimony.
ALF’s Amicus Brief:
ALF’s amicus brief argues that the trial judge abused her discretion when she failed to properly apply Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, as well as the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), which has been adopted in Pennsylvania. The amicus brief explains that the trial court failed to carry out its duty under Rule 702 in two different ways:
First, in denying ExxonMobil’s motion for a new trial, the trial judge inappropriately relied only on evidence from plaintiffs’ experts and failed to consider any evidence from ExxonMobil’s experts. In its 362-page opinion, the court extensively quoted (in cut-and-paste fashion) only plaintiffs’ experts. The opinion simply ignores the defense experts despite the fact that they identified and explained meaningful and significant methodological insufficiencies in plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions.
Second, the trial judge failed to carry out her duty under Rule 702(b) and (c) to assess whether the methodology plaintiffs’ experts claimed to use was generally accepted and applied in a conventional fashion in reaching their conclusions. More specifically, the trial court’s opinion fails to sufficiently analyze whether the plaintiffs’ experts’ methodology was generally accepted in cases such as this one, and further whether the case-specific application of their purported methodology (Bradford Hill) was conducted in the required “conventional fashion”, i.e. in a way that is generally accepted in the scientific community.
As a result, the trial court admitted into evidence extensive testimony regarding the wrong product (benzene) and failed to determine whether an association existed between the actual product at issue (gasoline) and the alleged injury. These errors tainted the entire proceeding in an unfair and highly prejudicial manner and require reversal.
Contact:
Email ALF Executive Vice President & General Counsel Lawrence Ebner.
